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The Impact of Market-oriented Reforms on Inequality in 
Transitional Countries: New Evidence from Cuba
Abstract
In the 90s the Cuban government implemented a set of market-oriented reforms in order to 
cope with the economic crisis caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. These reforms 
were followed by a sharp increase in inequality. This rise in inequality can be best understood 
by looking at what profitable economic exchanges are made possible to which actors by the 
reforms. Using survey data specifically collected in Havana we show that new opportunities 
to accumulate wealth accrue to actors who occupy positions whereby they can legitimately 
access exchanges that take place in hard currency. This advantage holds for both 
entrepreneurs and state-employees who work for state-owned enterprises operating in 
emergent sectors (intrapreneurs), suggesting that the distinction between market and plan is 
not paramount to explain inequality. Furthermore, actors that do not have legitimate access to 
exchanges in hard currency benefit from their personal ties to those actors that do. 
Keywords: Economic sociology, social networks, transitional economy, inequality, 
embeddedness
JEL classification: Z130 Economic Sociology; P20 Socialist Systems and Transitional 
Economies
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The relationship between institutions and inequality is a classical theme in sociology; the 
historical transformations leading to the emergence of market structures in formerly socialist 
economies provided interesting cases to study how institutional change affects the 
distribution of wealth. This historical opportunity motivated the rise of a wide research 
program that is known as market transition debate. The market transition literature includes 
two interrelated research problems that are analytically distinct: the dynamics of institutional 
changes, and how institutional change affects the distribution of wealth and thereby 
transforms stratification (Cao and Nee, 2000, cf. pp. 1184).  
Our study contributes theoretically and empirically to the second research problem: it 
examines the micro-mechanisms underlying the rise of inequality in Cuba in the period 
following the institutional reforms of the early 90s. Theoretically, we move the focus away 
from the traditional dichotomy between returns from human versus political capital and, 
following the new economic sociology approach, we concentrate on the structures that 
emerge as a consequence of the reforms. We argue that institutional changes are typically 
grafted onto a pre-existing institutional setting that, in turn, is the result of a historical 
process. Thus, changes in the distribution of wealth are not a straightforward consequence of 
the reforms, but rather the end result, often unintended, of a complex process involving 
changes in the opportunity structure that depend on how modifications of the formal rules 
interact with individual characteristic, personal relationships, and social norms and values. 
The Cuban reforms unintentionally generated patterns of economic exchange that resemble 
Zelizer’s (2005) circuits of commerce. In Cuba, the commercial circuits are associated to 
social norms regulating the access that, in turn, drive economic benefits towards those who 
have privileged access. Empirically, the Cuban case has been largely neglected in the market 
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transition debate, possibly due to the lack of statistical data as well as to Cuba’s distinctive 
historical path (see Galbraith, 2012 and Whitehead, 2007 on Cuba’s various anomalies). 
Moreover, the Cuban case provides an interesting example, because the Cuban reforms were 
enacted – as an emergency measure – by a government that remained institutionally 
committed to promote equality among its citizen (Galbraith, 2012). Yet, our data show that, 
due to differences in the opportunity for profitable exchanges created by the reforms, some 
categories of actors could profit from the institutional change and began accumulating 
wealth. 
Researchers who studied the implications of institutional change in post-communistic 
societies generally agree on two important points. First, state socialism is considered a 
particular type of institutional arrangement in which the integration – in Polanyian terms – of 
state, economy, and society is achieved by means of a wide redistribution of resources 
(Szelényi, 1978). Accordingly, in a socialist “redistributive” economy privileges accrue to a 
few so-called redistributors (i.e., current or former cadres). Second, it has been observed in 
various countries that inequality typically tends to increase shortly after centralized 
redistribution begins to give room to market, well before a full-fledged market economy is in 
place (Hellman, 1998). 
The scientific debate has centered on the transition mechanisms, aiming at identifying 
those actors who emerge as winners out of the institutional change. The market transition 
debate was initiated by Nee's (1989) market transition theory. In a nutshell, Nee argued that 
the introduction of market institutions inherently favors entrepreneurs at the expense of 
redistributors and leads to higher returns from human capital than under a centrally planned 
economy. Empirically, support for market transition theory was found in Hungary (e.g. 
Szelényi, 1988) and rural China (e.g. Nee 1989; 1991), but in various other post-socialist 
societies and in urban areas of China the power of cadres did not fade after the transition (e.g. 
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Bian and Logan, 1996; Walder, 1996). 
Three different arguments have been proposed to account for the resilience of the 
cadres' power and influence when their formal control over the mechanism of redistribution 
weakens due to marketization. First, the technocratic continuity argument (Róna-Tas, 1994) 
claims that the people who hold (or held) political positions in the socialist system succeed in 
maintaining their privileges during the transition, due to the technocratic expertise that they 
acquired through their role. Second, Staniszkis (1991) argued that the members of the old 
elite thrive during market transition by means of power conversion, i.e., by simply converting 
the power accumulated during state socialism into profitable assets in the new market 
economy (cf. also Rona-Tas, 1994). Third, Nee (1991) described the resilience of cadres’ 
influence as power persistence, arguing that during a phase of reforms, the market does not 
supplant bureaucratic coordination at once, but is rather grafted onto it, creating a segmented 
system. In such a segmented system, cadres continue to redistribute resources by virtue of 
their positional power, while market action may reinforce redistributive power (cf. also Bian 
and Logan, 1996). 
Some scholars variously attempted to integrate these different perspectives (Szelényi 
and Kostello, 1998; Cao and Nee, 2000). However, more generally there is increasing 
consensus that looking at market and redistribution as opposite ideal types of resources 
allocation constitutes a poor basis to predict how inequality changes in transitional economies 
(Walder, 1996). Market reforms differ enormously in their pace and nature between different 
countries, as well as between different regions within the same country. Hence, the different 
socioeconomic and political circumstances in which the reforms take place should not be 
overlooked (Szelényi and Kostello, 1998; Walder, Luo and Wang, 2013; Zhao and Zhou, 
2017). Following this line of argument, for example, Walder et al. (2013) argued that changes 
in the allocation of property rights predict changes in inequality in transition societies. 
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However, as our study shows, the economic benefits of institutional reforms are not 
necessarily confined to those individuals that are directly affected by changes in the 
allocation of property rights. 
Consistent with the new economic sociology approach, in this paper we focus on 
emerging market structures, conceived as sets of exchange relationships to which some 
categories of actors have privileged access. In particular, we show that the effects of 
marketization on inequality in post-socialist societies can be predicted by looking at what 
profitable economic exchanges are made possible by the reforms, and which actors occupy 
the positions that benefit from these exchanges. Focusing on emerging exchange relationships 
allowed us to provide an accurate description of the Cuban case where reforms remained 
partial, and to specify the causal mechanism through which newly introduced forms of 
economic activities interact with the actors’ network and normative embeddedness.
In the Cuban case, the effects of the economic crisis following the collapse of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, hereafter) were particularly strong 
because Cuba's international trade was heavily dependent on CMEA partners. In addition, 
unlike the European post-communist countries that were similarly struck by the economic 
crisis, Cuba's trading alternatives were severely limited by the economic sanctions imposed 
by the US, as well as by the lack of credit from international agencies (e.g., World Bank and 
IMF). Accordingly, the marketization of some economic sectors was the only possible 
strategy to attract foreign investments. However, we argue that, in order to isolate these 
market segments, the Cuban policies created niches between “structurally semi-independent 
coexisting economies” (Dominguez, 2004, pp. 31) – to which we refer as commercial circuits 
(Zelizer, 2005) – that segregated the product markets that operate in dollars from those that 
operate in pesos. Consequently, the reforms had the perverse effect of increasing inequality 
by benefiting those actors who occupied the niches. From a theoretical point of view, we 
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argue that inequality is affected by the availability of resources that are embedded in various 
types of social relationships. Using data from the first quantitative survey ever conducted in 
Cuba by foreign scholars, we show 1) how the reforms determined the emergence of new 
exchange relationships that benefited specific categories of actors, thereby causing an 
increase in inequality: 2) how actors resort to their personal contacts to mitigate inequality. In 
the conclusion, we will briefly discuss the implications concerning the path of institutional 
change in Cuba. 
2. The emergence of commercial circuits
In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s international trade faced a sudden 
dramatic shrinkage, both in volume and in value terms. The ensuing economic crisis was 
exacerbated by the United States government’s comprehensive economic sanctions and by 
the internal inefficiency of the Cuban economic system. In that situation of sudden and deep 
isolation, the Cuban government implemented a set of market-oriented reforms in order to 
reintegrate Cuba into the global economy. 
Between 1990-94, the most remarkable changes included: 1) a partial opening of the 
Cuban economy to foreign investments; 2) a partial dollarization of specific segments of the 
economy, leading to monetary duality; 3) an enlargement of the list of jobs that could be 
carried out by self-employed workers; and 4) a raise in the prices of “non-essential” products. 
The depenalization of USD’s possession and the legalization of self-employment were 
approved, among other things, to incorporate part of the widespread informal economy into 
the formal economy. Nonetheless, these market-oriented reforms were not accompanied by 
any major political reforms and the Cuban government insisted on presenting them as a 
“necessary evil”. The implementation of these market-oriented reforms was thus very 
cautious and accompanied by a series of adjustments designed to mitigate some of the effects 
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of the earlier liberalizations (Hernández and Domínguez, 2013). Yet, since the so-called 
“periodo especial”, i.e., the special period, in which the Cuban government relaxed 
centralized economic planning, economic inequality – which had been previously in steady 
decline since the 1960s – started to grow. Despite the Cuban government never published 
statistics on income distribution (Mesa-Lago, 2015), this raise in inequality is commonly 
accepted both by foreign and Cuban scholars (Togores-González and García-Álvarez, 2004; 
Espina-Prieto and Togores-González, 2012; Spadoni 2014). 
The reforms implemented in Cuba during the special period are documented in details 
elsewhere (e.g., Dominguez, 2004; 2012). However, two points need to be addressed because 
they are essential to understand the effects of the institutional change. The first one is the 
partial opening of the Cuban economy to foreign investors. The second one is the 
introduction of the monetary duality. The opening of the Cuban borders was a slow process 
that started at the end of the 1980s when CMEA began to weaken. As intended by the 
government, foreign tourists and investors brought hard currency to the Island, allowing the 
state to obtain indispensable resources to support its planned economy. International tourists 
were almost completely absent from Cuba until 1990, but their number increased rapidly in 
subsequent years reaching over 2.5 million per year in the period when the data presented 
here were collected (Cuban National Statistics Bureau – ONEI, 2012).
The current dual currency system came into existence in two steps. First, the 
possession of US dollars was de-penalized (1993-1994), in order to attract remittances and 
investors from abroad. At a later stage (2003-2004), in order to impose a greater control on 
financial resources held in USD, the Cuban government replaced the dollar with the 
convertible Cuban peso. Thus, since 2004, two domestic currencies circulate simultaneously 
in Cuba: the Cuban peso (or Moneda Nacional, MN hereafter) and the convertible Cuban 
peso (CUC hereafter). The exchange rates are fixed but they differ for natural and juridical 
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persons. More specifically, individual holders of foreign currency are obliged to purchase 
CUC, whose exchange rate is linked to the USD (currently 1:1) and is decided by the Cuban 
government. The CUC/MN exchange rate is 1:25 to buy CUC and slightly lower to sell CUC. 
However, for Cuban enterprises and institutions, the MN and the CUC are equal in value. 
Thus, unlike natural persons, juridical entities (companies and institutions) operate at a fixed 
1 $: 1 CUC: 1 MN exchange rate, but they are forbidden to change MN into CUC1. The 
existence of multiple (and unrealistic) exchange rates alters the state's as well as enterprises' 
accounting system in at least three ways. First, the CUC/MN exchange rate (1:1) makes 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs, hereafter) who officially operate in MN, but export part of 
their products, appear to be less profitable than they actually are. Second, the artificial parity 
between MN and USD paradoxically incentivizes import at the expense of internal 
production (Dominguez, 2012), because imports are paid in USD but registered on the 
account books in MN, at the (artificial) 1:1 exchange rate, thereby making import look 
cheaper than internal production. Third, the impossibility for SOEs to convert MN into CUC 
stimulates them to focus on activities that bring CUC rather than MN (Hidalgo de los Santos 
and Doimeadiós-Reyes, 2003). These distortions reverberate on supply and demand causing 
scarcity of some goods and relative abundance of others.  
The presence of a dual currency system accompanied by formal and informal norms 
regulating exchanges (in addition to a rationing distribution system) determines the existence 
of commercial circuits (Zelizer, 2005). Commercial circuits are defined as “sets of social 
relationships and shared economic activities, accompanied by a common accounting system 
(e.g., local currencies, tokens or vouchers), shared understandings, and boundaries between 
members and non-members” (Preda, 2009, pp. 87). As noted by Zelizer (2005), by definition 
every circuit consists of dynamic, meaningful, incessantly negotiated interactions among 
social sites – be these sites individuals, households, organizations, or other social entities. 
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Circuits include distinctive sets of goods and services that can be exchanged and specific 
morals and rules that have shared meanings for the people within a circuit. In its original 
formulation Zelizer (2005) introduced the idea of commercial circuits in order to highlight 
that every market relies on culturally meaningful interpersonal relations. We argue that 
commercial circuits are applicable to the Cuban case for three reasons. First, commercial 
circuits allow escaping the dichotomy between plan and market ideal types as institutional 
basis for inequality, and providing a deeper account of the emerging patterns of economic 
exchange. In addition, focusing on commercial circuits leads to more specific predictions, 
especially in the Cuban case where market reforms remained partial and the socialist 
redistributive system is still p evalent. Second, the relevant exchange relationships can be 
explicited in the framework of commercial circuits, thereby linking embeddedness and 
economic action. Third, commercial circuits do not reduce the explanation to the co-existence 
of multiple currencies, because circuits include both formal and informal norms that regulate 
the exchanges that take place within the circuits. For example, as we argue in the theory 
section, the emergence of commercial circuits in Cuba is accompanied by the establishment 
of social norms and stigmas that further isolate the circuit in which the most desirable goods 
are exchanged.
Given the dual currency system (with multiple exchange rates) illustrated above, at 
least three institutionalized circuits of commerce are currently active on the island, each 
circuit is identified by the media in which exchanges take place: the libreta circuit (rationing 
distribution system), the MN circuit, and the CUC circuit.
2.1 The Libreta Circuit
Since 1962, on the basis of an egalitarian redistributive principle, some goods are provided 
for free or at a trivial price to all the population, in the libreta circuit. These goods include 
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basic commodities as well as housing-related services (repair, ordinary and extraordinary 
upkeep). The State distributes the same goods and services to every citizen and resident 
belonging to the same age group with similar health conditions – regardless of her/his 
employment status or working position.
2.2 The MN Circuit
The MN circuit concerns various goods and services produced by SOEs, cooperatives and 
self-employed workers. In the MN circuit prices often are regulated, i.e., either they are 
centrally determined, or an informal ceiling is imposed, sometimes also for products and 
services provided by self-employed workers or micro-enterprises (Mesa-Lago, 2009).  In 
some cases, the right to purchase some goods ordinarily sold in MN is subordinate to other 
priority rules. For example, access to internet and home phones is not guaranteed to every 
potentially MN-solvable buyer, but only to those who are eligible according to their 
professional position. Officially, both residents and nonresidents can enter the MN circuit. 
However, the access to health care and medicines, tourist accommodation, transportation and 
cultural and leisure-related services is restricted to residents only.  The authorities monitor 
self-employed workers operating in MN to ensure that they comply with such restrictions. 
Nonresidents rarely participate in the MN circuit anyway, because: 1) they simply do not 
know that some MN goods and services exist; 2) when they know they typically assume – 
often due to misperceptions – that these goods and services are of very poor quality; 3) 
residents generally frown upon nonresidents who try to purchase MN goods; 4) nonresidents' 
requests to exchange CUC into MN are seldom granted. 
The MN circuit serves the Cuban workers, who generally receive salaries or pensions 
in MN, as the public sector still employs the largest number of people (83% of Cuban labor 
force in 2010). The distortions caused by multiple exchange rates concur in making the 
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supply of goods and services circulating in this circuit, as well as in the libreta circuit, 
unreliable. 
2.3 The CUC Circuit
The CUC circuit was created on the remains of the dollar-based market formerly restricted to 
diplomatic staff. The commodities and services circulating in this circuit are produced and/or 
distributed by SOEs, joint ventures and self-employed workers. Prices in the CUC circuit are 
ostensibly regulated by supply and demand, but the state intervenes heavily with taxation. 
The CUC circuit includes leisure and opulent commodities (such as tourist accommodations, 
discos, air and bus transportation, cellular phones, internet points, and household appliances), 
but also groceries and basic goods whenever they happen to be missing or in short supply in 
the other two circuits. The existence of multiple CUC/MN exchange rates generates 
incentives to import and sell products in CUC, thereby making shortages uncommon in this 
circuit. 
Although at the beginning almost exclusively nonresidents could access the CUC 
circuit, today formally everybody (whether resident or not) can purchase goods and services 
in the CUC circuit due to the progressive elimination of formal prohibitions. From a legal 
viewpoint, in order for a resident to make a purchase in CUC, it is sufficient to prove that the 
necessary sum was earned from legal activities (e.g. job or remittances). However, CUC 
circuit goods are very expensive (because of high taxes) and residents who routinely buy 
goods in this circuit risk to be controlled by the police or by the fiscal authorities. Moreover, 
the authorities generally discourage social interactions between actors with differential 
accesses to the circuits (i.e., between residents and non residents). For example, being 
observed repeatedly in the company of foreigners, while lacking any apparent legitimate 
work- or family-related reason to do so, may easily elicit the intervention of the police 
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(Taylor, 2009).  
3. Theory and hypotheses
As stated earlier, the government de-penalized the possession of USD and introduced the 
monetary duality in order to attract investments and remittances from abroad and collect the 
hard currency already present on the Island (Dominguez, 2004). The incoming flow in CUC 
was supposed to be distributed in the MN and libreta circuits, thereby benefiting the Cuban 
residents, particularly the most vulnerable part of the population. Nevertheless, both Cuban 
and foreign scholars argue that, despite its original purpose, the partial dollarization of the 
economy provided the institutional basis for exclusion and inequality (Dominguez, 2004; 
Togores-González and García-Álvarez 2004; Santiso and Dayton-Johnson, 2012). In order to 
uncover the mechanisms by means of which the institutional reforms had such perverse 
effects, we focus on the exchange relationships through which individuals can accumulate 
wealth. In particular, we consider: 1) the favorable economic exchange relationships that are 
made possible by the coexistence of multiple commercial circuits, and 2) the personal 
exchange relationships that actors can mobilize in order to obtain scarce resources.
Since the existence of multiple CUC/MN exchange rates determines scarcity in the 
MN circuit, the satisfaction of essential needs has become closely dependent on the access to 
hard currency. Besides remittances, the possibility to obtain hard currency depends on the 
extent to which a Cuban can operate on the CUC circuit without incurring formal or informal 
sanctions. While the MN and libreta circuits are supposedly reserved to ordinary Cuban 
residents, both formal barriers and social norms make access to CUC rather difficult for them. 
However, some actors have privileged access to all circuits, including legitimate 
opportunities to interact routinely with those actors formally confined to the CUC circuit (i.e., 
mainly foreigners or Cuban expatriates, we refer to these as "CUC actors”, hereafter). The 
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legitimacy of these opportunities is emphasized because in Cuba relationships with CUC 
actors, and particularly foreigners, are rather ambivalent. On the one hand, interactions with 
actors carrying heavy currency are understandably desirable; on the other hand, contacts with 
foreigners are generally discouraged or stigmatized, because they can be easily perceived as 
opportunistic2. The possibility to interact legitimately with CUC actors is primarily a function 
of one's occupation, but other factors – such as personal networks, reputation, and prestige – 
play a role too. For example, all front office occupations in the international touristic sectors 
have legitimate contacts with foreigners, by definition. However, also individuals with other 
occupations, such as sales representatives, academics or doctors, can have legitimate contacts 
with nonresidents, depending on their international prestige and their reputation with the 
Cuban authorities. The impact of market-oriented reforms on inequality cannot be simply 
related to economic sector or occupational title or status, it requires new analytical categories. 
Facing a similar problem in a Chinese context, Bian and Logan (1996, pp. 744, 748) 
described the advantage enjoyed by some workers as a function of their “market 
connectedness”, i.e., their involvement in transactions outside their working units. However, 
in China the degree of marketization was (and still is) higher, there was no monetary duality, 
and the advantages depended on the workers' involvement in transactions involving direct 
producers and clients. Conversely, in Cuba the advantages depend on the workers' 
involvement in transactions that take place inside niches created by the existence of multiple 
commercial circuits. 
The access to the CUC circuit provides individuals with two types of advantages. On 
the one hand, they can act as gatekeepers (Corra and Willer, 2002) between otherwise 
disconnected categories of actors, i.e., foreigners and Cuban residents. On the other hand, 
they can easily profit from arbitrage, e.g., buying goods in the MN circuit and selling them in 
the CUC circuit. These activities include both formal transactions and exchanges in the 
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informal economy and are analogous to a form of brokerage between structurally separate 
groups that Burt (1992, pp. 148) describes as “institutional hole”.
Actors enjoying these opportunities for gatekeeping and arbitrage can be distinguished 
in two types, depending on their form of employment: state employees who work for SOEs 
operating in the CUC circuit, and self-employed workers who hold a license to operate in 
CUC (cuentapropistas). This distinction is important for two reasons: first, while both can act 
as gatekeepers due to their occupation, the latter face entrepreneurial risk, the former do not. 
In fact, state employees often operate a “private business” within the state organization that 
employs them, sometimes exploiting its infrastructure. Hence, we refer to self-employed 
workers as entrepreneurs and to state employees as intrapreneurs, hereafter3. Second, the 
public perception of these two categories of workers is different. Self-employed workers are 
perceived as extraneous to the principles upon which the socialist state is built, and 
stigmatized as “new rich” (e.g., see Castro, 2005; Ritter and Henken, 2014). By contrast, state 
employees ostensibly contribute to the collection of hard currency on account of the state. 
Technically, they are two very different categories. Entrepreneurs are market actors who 
work for profit; intrapreneurs are state employees who earn a fixed salary. Our analysis of 
the commercial circuits highlights two similar but distinct mechanisms. On the one hand, 
benefits accrue to those individuals who are formally entitled to transactions in the CUC 
circuit, because they act as gatekeepers. On the other hand, those actors who are not formally 
entitled to exchanges in the CUC circuit but – due to their job – face similar constrains, 
manage to avoid the social stigma and enjoy similar benefits.   
The predicted advantage enjoyed by entrepreneurs is consistent with some previous 
research findings from Cuban qualitative studies according to which entrepreneurs operating 
in CUCs are effectively becoming richer in spite of heavy taxation (see CEPAL, 2000; 
Espina-Prieto, 2004). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 1a: because of gatekeeping opportunities, entrepreneurs who 
operate in CUCs are wealthier than normal workers who have no legitimate 
reason to interact with CUC actors
By contrast, intrapreneurs work in SOEs. Therefore, under the redistributive system 
they receive a fixed salary without any additional benefit4. Nevertheless, their position inside 
organizations operating in the CUC circuit allows them to exploit the same opportunities for 
gatekeeping and arbitrage as the entrepreneurs. Thus, although they should formally be as 
rich as any other state employee, we predict that they will be richer than regular workers who 
lack those opportunities.
Hypothesis 1b: because of gatekeeping opportunities, intrapreneurs (i.e., state 
employees who interact routinely with CUC actors) are wealthier than normal 
workers who have no legitimate reason to interact with CUC actors
The second type of exchange relationships that we consider are those connecting 
actors to personal contacts through which they can obtain scarce resources. The extensive 
literature on social capital amply demonstrated that personal networks play an important role 
in the accumulation of both wealth and status (e.g., Burt, 1992; Lin, 2001). In particular, an 
individual's social capital depends on the resources possessed by his/her contacts that can be 
mobilized through the membership in social networks or larger social structures (Lin, 2001). 
Which personal relationships are most important with respect to inequality however, depends 
strongly on the institutional context and on what type of inequality is considered. In planned 
economies, income inequality tends to be generally low because salaries are centrally 
determined, but sudden shortages of goods are endemic (Kornai, 1980). In Cuba, shortages 
have been aggravated by the economic crisis following the fall of the Soviet bloc. 
Accordingly, personal wealth is affected by the capability to procure scarce goods and 
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services and individuals need to form relationships with others who can help acquiring such 
assets. These types of relationships, called provision ties, are peculiar to shortage economies 
(Völker ad Flap, 2001).  
As we argued in the background of the previous two hypotheses, the access to the 
CUC circuit is a main determinant of inequality in Cuba. Therefore, provision ties to actors 
who have some sources of income in CUC – either through remittances or through their 
occupation – are particularly valuable. Consequently, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: independent of own circuital position, the more an individual 
has provision ties to actors having frequent revenues in CUCs, the wealthier 
he/she is.
Furthermore, as various scarce (and expensive) goods can be purchased only in the 
CUC circuit, we expect that provision contacts having revenues in CUCs are particularly 
important for those individuals who do not have opportunity to access the CUC circuit 
themselves.  
Hypothesis 3: The possibility to access indirectly the CUC circuit, through 
personal contacts, has a stronger positive effect on individual wealth for those 
who do not have direct access to the CUC circuit, than for those who do.
As provision ties serve the purpose of coping with shortages, the variety of goods that 
individuals can obtain through their provision network increases with the network's 
heterogeneity in terms of resources controlled by the contacts. Empirically, evidence from 
former East Germany shows that indeed provision networks tend to be highly heterogeneous 
(Völker and Flap, 2001). Accordingly, assuming that personal wealth increases with the 
efficacy of the provision network, we expect that network heterogeneity positively affects 
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Hypothesis 4: independent of own circuital position, the higher the 
heterogeneity of an individual's provision network, the wealthier he/she is.
As described earlier, in spite of the reforms, in Cuba the mechanism of centralized 
redistribution maintains an important role. For example, key positions inside SOEs, including 
those operating in emerging sectors (i.e., sectors in which exchanges in CUC are highly 
prevalent, such as the touristic sector), are still appointed by the central government. 
Accordingly, we expect that redistributors continue to exert some control over economic 
resources as it typically occurs when market and redistributive principles coexist (Nee, 1991; 
Szelényi and Kostello, 1998). Therefore, we hypothesize that individuals who can mobilize 
redistributors as provisional contacts enjoy various advantages: not only a preferential access 
to resources directly controlled by their contacts, but also referrals and protection.
Hypothesis 5: independent of own circuital position, the more an individual 
has provision ties to redistributors, the wealthier he/she is.
Under the same line of reasoning, one would expect that redistributors themselves are capable 
to accumulate wealth, even more so if they exert their authority in the CUC circuit. However, 
this hypothesis cannot be tested because redistributors are by definition very few (about 5% 
of the state-workers, according to ONEI 2011) and it is practically impossible to obtain data 
on them. We will return to this issue when discussing the implications of our analyses.
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4. Data and analyses
4.1 The Sample
Data collection took place in Havana between May 2010 and January 2011. Interviewers 
were recruited among top sociology students and trained by the authors. As we were forced to 
collect data without a sampling frame, we designed the sample as to ensure that the data 
included enough observations from individuals with different access to the commercial 
circuits, in order to obtain the required statistical power to test hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
Circuital positions – associated with the opportunity for legitimate contact with CUC actors 
or lack thereof – constitute our main independent variable. We identified three commercial 
circuits, related to the currency in which goods and services are exchanged. However, while 
the access to two of them – the MN and libreta – is universal and inconsequential in terms of 
wealth, we argue that the possibility to interact routinely with CUC actors is a major 
determinant of inequality. Thus, our main distinction is between individuals that have 
legitimate contacts with CUC actors and those who do not. As we explained earlier, having 
access to CUC actors depends on a number of factors, including personal characteristics, and 
of course, no complete list of these individuals is available. In addition, it is not always 
evident whether a given individual has contacts with CUC actors (e.g., for a university 
professor it depends on her international prestige). Thus, in order to avoid excessive 
screening costs (Sudman, Sirken and Cowan, 1988), we selected respondents from segments 
of the population that have legitimate contacts with CUC actors with certainty. Accordingly, 
we sampled gatekeepers among those who hold front office positions in the touristic sector – 
either self-employed (entrepreneurs) or state employees (intrapreneurs) – and non-
gatekeepers among workers lacking any legitimate reason to interact with CUC actors. Note 
that, although we do not have quantitative data on the normative dimension that regulates the 
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access to exchanges with CUC actors, our sample choice is based on the assumption that 
access to these exchanges is regulated by social norms, in line with Zelizer’s (2005) 
definition of commercial circuits. We supported this assumption with a detailed description 
of Cuba’s commercial circuits, based on extensive fieldwork. Thus, our sample consists of 
three groups:
1) entrepreneurs (n = 95, 26% of the whole sample);
2) intrapreneurs (n = 116, 32% of the whole sample);
3) MN workers (n = 149, 42% of the whole sample).  
Entrepreneurs are self-employed owners of bed and breakfast who are licensed to sell 
their services in CUCs. Intrapreneurs are tourist guides or entertainers working as employees 
in SOEs, who are routinely in contact with CUC actors. MN workers constitute our reference 
category, consisting of ordinary workers who, due to their job, have no legitimate chance to 
come in contact with CUC actors (45% of them are professionals and bureaucrats, 5% are 
military officers, and the remaining are semi-skilled or unskilled workers). Note that highly 
educated high-status individuals are overrepresented among MN workers. This introduces a 
conservative bias with respect to the test of our main hypotheses, i.e., overrepresentation of 
presumably privileged individuals within the group that we predict to be poorer. For each 
group the initial target was to reach at least 70-80 cases. Fortunately, the data collection 
process worked better than expected, the response rate was about 87%, and a sizeable 
statistical sample (N = 360) could be reached. The data collection procedure and sample 
characteristics are described in appendix.
4.2 Measures
The questionnaire consisted of questions concerning personal characteristics, social 
relationships, and wealth. Concerning social relationships, we included a name generator 
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(i.e., a question eliciting information on personal contacts) that was specifically designed to 
collect information about the contacts to whom the respondent turns in order to attain scarce 
goods and services. As for wealth, respondents were asked to indicate which goods they 
possessed from a list of items that are either expensive or simply difficult to obtain in Cuba. 
4.2.1 Dependent variable. 
Most studies on economic inequality use data on income. However, as recently discussed by 
Ward (2014) despite their popularity, monetary measures are particularly problematic, 
especially in developing countries, as monetary incomes routinely exhibit great seasonal 
variations, while consumption expenditures tend to be naturally smoother. Moreover, in Cuba 
asking for the individual or family income was not advisable for at least two further reasons. 
First, salaries tend to be rather equal (Galbraith, 2012) and do not reflect standards of 
individual wealth (García-Álvarez and Anaya, 2015). On the contrary, wealth actually 
depends on other things such as additional revenues, remittances, and individual ability to 
obtain scarce resources, for example through personal relationships (Togores-González and 
García-Álvarez, 2004; Echevarria-Léon et al. 2018). Second, Cubans are generally reluctant 
to provide detailed information on their income, especially if part of it stems from activities 
not directly related to the formal job and sometimes even illegal (note that salaries are 
estimated to account for less than half of the income, see Galtès-Galeano, 2017). Moreover, 
as shown by Echevarria-Léon et al. (2018), the universal provision of basic non-monetary 
assets (health, education, housing etc.) still represents a key underpinning for the well-being 
of the Cuban population and the access to these essential goods has remained rather 
egalitarian and constant since 2006 (see Galbraith, 2012 for the period 1989-2006). House 
ownership likewise does not discriminate between rich and poor in Cuba5 where selling 
houses was illegal for decades. Only in 2011, after the data collection, a fledgling legal 
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private market for houses was legalized. Yet, most Cubans still today live in dwellings that 
were originally provided by the state, or were self-built with the help of generous state 
subsidies (Echevarria-Léon et al. 2018). Accordingly, wealthy people tend to consume rather 
than invest their income (see Szelényi and Kostello, 1998). Therefore, we opted for a 
measurement of wealth based on the possession of durable goods, which is often used to 
study wealth and living standards (e.g., Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Kakwani and Silber, 2007; 
Ward 2014). Similar to income, declaring the possession of scarce and expensive goods could 
be subject to a bias (i.e., individuals hiding expensive goods, unlikely to have been accessible 
given their formal salary). However, this bias is conservative with respect to our hypotheses 
because it is likely to apply in particular to goods purchased with income obtained through 
gatekeeping activities. From an initial set of 23 items included in the battery on the ownership 
of durable goods and transportation capital, seven goods, fitting the requirements of the 
Rasch measurement model were selected to be included in the wealth index: mobile phone, 
computer or notebook, camera, microwave, air-conditioning, car, and freezer. We constructed 
the index using the raschtest command in stata (Hardouin, 2007). In addition, an alternative 
index was constructed using polychoric principal component analysis (Kolenikov and 
Angeles, 2009) on 20 items. The two distinct indexes of wealth correlated strongly (r = 0,95), 
but the Rasch index is theoretically superior because it is more restrictive as it ensures that 
the selected items only depend on the latent trait (i.e., the ability to acquire the goods) and it 
excludes items that do not match the model’s requirements6. Furthermore, the rasch index is 
straightforwardly interpretable as a variable counting the number of luxury goods. Therefore, 
the analyses presented below are conducted using the Rasch index. We included the 
alternative model using the scale constructed with polychoric PCA in appendix. The Rasch 
index is a count variable, ranging from 0 to 7. As it is typical of income distributions, our 
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wealth index is slightly right skewed. Descriptive statistics of this index and of all 
independent variables are reported in Table 1. 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
Circuital position (hypothesis 1a and 1b) is operationalized using two dummy variables, one 
for entrepreneurs and one for intrapreneurs. The reference category is our control group, 
consisting of workers who do not have access to CUC and thus no gatekeeping opportunities. 
Social capital was measured using a name generator eliciting provision ties (i.e. contacts to 
whom respondents ask for help whenever they need “any scarce good or service – for 
example, home repair, help with legal matters, automobile repair, electronic appliance etc.”). 
Respondents could name up to six contacts. In addition, respondents provided information on 
several attributes per each contact, including sex, education, nationality (whether Cuban), 
profession, time of acquaintance, type and strength of the relationship, and whether the 
contact has income in CUC (always, almost always, almost never, never). The role of 
provision ties to actors accessing the CUC circuit (hypothesis 2) was operationalized simply 
counting the number of ties to actors who receive “always” or “almost always” income in 
CUC. The variable CUC ties is discrete and ranges between 0 and 6. Hypothesis 3 – 
concerning the relative importance of provision ties to actors accessing the CUC circuit for 
those who do not have access themselves – was operationalized with an interaction effect 
between circuital position and the variable CUC ties. As we hypothesized that these ties are 
especially important for those individuals who do not routinely access the CUC circuit 
themselves (i.e., our reference group with respect to circuital position), we interacted the 
variable CUC ties with a dummy variable taking value 1 if the respondent belongs to either 
one of the other two groups (intrapreneurs and entrepreneurs) and 0 otherwise.
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The heterogeneity of the individual provision network (hypothesis 4) was 
operationalized in terms of the occupation of the contacts. The occupation of the contacts was 
coded using a slightly adjusted version of the Cuban Standard Classification of Occupation 
(CNUO). This classification consisted of nine categories; we created a specific category for 
foreigners because they are valuable ties as such, irrespectively of their occupation. For the 
same reason self-employed workers were likewise put in a specific category. We 
operationalized occupational heterogeneity of the provision network by means of an index for 
qualitative variation (IQV), which takes value 0 when all contacts belong to the same 
occupational category and 1 when each contact belongs to a different category (Agresti and 
Agresti, 1978). The variable heterogeneity was computed as follows:
where k is the number of categories (in our case restricted to six because respondents could 
name up to six contacts) and pi is the proportion of observations in category i.
Ties to redistributors (hypothesis 5) were likewise identified using the occupation of 
the contacts: legislators, senior officials, and managers were counted as redistributors. 27 
respondents (7.5%) had one tie to a redistributor, seven (1.9%) had two, and nobody had 
more than two. Therefore, we operationalized hypothesis 5 with a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if the respondent had one or more contacts to redistributors and zero otherwise.
Control variables. The statistical model presented below includes dummy variables for sex, 
race, (college) education, whether the respondent receives remittances, and whether the 
respondent is a member of the Cuban Communist Party. Furthermore, we controlled for age, 
modeled as a quadratic function.
Page 23 of 50
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ser































































TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
4.3 Statistical model
The dependent variable is measured by the number of goods owned by respondents. This 
variable is a discrete count, its distribution is right skewed but not zero inflated, nor 
overdispersed (likelihood ratio test of the overdispersion parameter alpha: χ2 = 0.00, p = 0.5). 
Accordingly, the hypotheses were tested using a poisson regression model (deviance 
goodness of fit χ2 = 384.9, p = 0.07, indicating that a poisson model is appropriate). In order 
to check for the robustness of our results we also estimated a linear regression on the wealth 
scale obtained using a polychoric PCA (included in the appendix) and the results were 
substantively the same. 
5. Results
Table 2 presents the results of three poisson regression models on individual wealth. Model 1 
only includes control variables. Model 2 includes also the five independent variables 
referring to hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2, 4, and 5. In Model 3 the interaction term between circuital 
position and CUC ties was added (hypothesis 3). Hypotheses 1a and 1b are supported. Both 
entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs are richer: ceteris paribus entrepreneurs are predicted to own 
141% goods more than the reference group and intrapreneurs 78% more. It is important to 
recall that as MN workers and intrapreneurs are both state employees, they are formally 
subject to the same egalitarian wage regime. In addition, entrepreneurs are significantly richer 
than intrapreneurs (χ2 = 12.09; df = 1; p < 0.01). Pairwise comparisons between the groups 
are affected by two conservative biases. First, our intrapreneurs consist mainly of highly 
educated but low-level employees as we could not access any manager of SOEs, who are 
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presumably richer. Therefore, the difference in wealth between intrapreneurs and MN 
workers (hypothesis 1b) could be underestimated while the difference between entrepreneurs 
and intrapreneurs (for which we presented no hypothesis) could be overestimated. 
Furthermore, the idea that high-ranking intrapreneurs (e.g., managers of SOEs) could be 
accumulating wealth is also consistent with the results of studies conducted in other post-
socialist countries, who found that a privileged class of redistributors manage to benefit from 
the reforms (cf. Nee, 1991; Rona-Tas, 1994; Bian and Logan, 1996). Second, as already 
mentioned in the sample section, professionals and bureaucrats are over-represented among 
MN workers (about 45%). These occupational categories enjoy the highest salaries in MN 
and they have more chances of enjoying some goods/services distributed as rewards by 
government agencies. Consequently, the difference between our reference group and the 
gatekeepers (hypotheses 1a and 1b) could be underestimated. 
Concerning the hypotheses on the effects of personal relationships, each additional 
provision tie to a person with revenues in CUCs yields a 10.5% increase in the expected 
count7, ceteris paribus. However, this effect only holds for those individuals who do not have 
direct access to the CUC circuit themselves (i.e., our reference group for hypothesis 1a and 
1b). Comparing model 2 and model 3, the main effect of CUC ties is only significant when 
the interaction is added. In model 3, main effect and interaction cancel each other out, 
suggesting that entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs do not obtain additional benefits in terms of 
wealth from CUC ties. Thus, hypothesis 2 is not supported, while hypothesis 3 finds support.
Hypothesis 4, concerning the heterogeneity of the provision networks is likewise 
supported: the expected count of an individual with a maximally heterogeneous network – 
i.e., one in which every contact has a different occupation – is 31% higher than that of an 
individual with minimum heterogeneity – i.e., one in which every contact has the same 
profession. Finally, personal wealth is not significantly affected by having ties to 
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redistributors. Therefore, hypothesis 5 is not supported. As anticipated when discussing the 
hypotheses, we could not check whether redistributors themselves are wealthier, because it 
was not possible to interview enough redistributors to have the statistical power. In particular, 
redistributors operating in the CUC circuit (such as, for example, managers of SOEs 
operating in the emergent sector) are predicted to be wealthy by two mechanisms: 
redistribution and gatekeeping. However, such rare figures were inaccessible to our 
interviewers. Nevertheless, ten redistributors were included among the MN workers (i.e., 
individuals with no gatekeeping opportunities): nine managers and senior officials and one 
senior military officer. They correspond to 6,7% of our MN workers sample and, according 
to ONEI – but based on a broader categorization – they were 5,5% of the workers population 
in Havana (ONEI, 2013). These ten respondents do not appear to be richer than the other MN 
workers. Excluding them from the models does not substantively affect the results. Therefore, 
these ten observations were eventually included in the models presented below8.      
Among control variables we found significant effects of age and receiving 
remittances. As typically found in the literature on economic inequality, the effect of age on 
wealth is parabolic. Wealth increases with age, with a negative quadratic effect. As 
remittances provide an additional source of income, by definition in foreign currency, they 
have a positive effect on personal wealth (Barberia, 2004; Eckstein, 2010). Interestingly, in 
our sample we found no effects of party membership, race (only marginally significant in 
model 1), and gender, and only a weak effect of education (in model 1 and 3). To be more 
specific, if we look at zero order effects we find that blacks are poorer than white (p < 0.01), 
but no significant difference between men and women, even when all controls are removed (p 
= 0.741). These results deserve to be considered in the light of findings from previous 
researches conducted in Cuba. Other scholars (e.g. Espina-Prieto and Togores-González, 
2012) found that women are poorer than men and blacks are poorer than whites, using 
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qualitative interviews. By contrast, our results suggest that race differences could be 
explained away or sensibly reduced when other factors are controlled for – in particular, 
whether respondents have regular access to the hard currency circuit, while gender 
differences appear insignificant in our sample. However, addressing this issue would require 
further research with larger national samples. Popular belief holds that the Cuban Communist 
Party maintains political consensus by rewarding its own members. Yet, while we cannot 
exclude that – as argued by Corrales (2004) – highly attractive positions are indeed 
strategically attributed to loyalists by the party, we found that party members are not richer 
than non-members. For party affiliation, the zero order effect is actually negative. Although 
this effect is only almost significant (p = 0.088), it could be an indication that, as long as 
emerging business activities are considered strategic as much as they are viewed as a 
potential threat to the socialist values, most party members are insulated from the CUC 
circuit (Romanò, 2016; cf. Szeleny and Kostello, 1998).
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
6. Discussion and conclusions
The present study focuses on the effects of a set of market-oriented reforms implemented in 
Cuba starting at the beginning of the 1990s in order to cope with the economic crisis, while 
protecting its redistributive system. We argued that two reforms were particularly important 
factors in the subsequent increase in inequality: the opening to foreign investments, trade, and 
people, and the partial dollarization of the economy. Inequality was investigated in light of 
two mechanisms. These two mechanisms share a common theoretical perspective: in both 
cases inequality results from the availability of resources embedded in exchange 
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relationships. First and foremost, the reforms lead to the emergence of new socio-economic 
structures that we described as commercial circuits (Zelizer, 2005). As the opportunities to 
access different commercial circuits are not uniform among residents, the existence of 
barriers between the circuits provides the basis for the emergence of asymmetric exchange 
relationships. In particular, privileged access to the circuit where transactions occur in hard 
currency is associated to various advantages, such as opportunities for gatekeeping and 
arbitrage. This idea finds support in our data: those actors (i.e., entrepreneurs and state 
employees who work in SOEs operating in emergent sectors) who, due to their occupation, 
are free to exchange regularly with both residents and nonresidents, are substantially richer 
than those who are restricted to exchange predominantly with residents.
Second, inequality is generally affected by individual social capital, i.e., the ability to 
mobilize resources through personal contacts. In “shortage economies” social capital includes 
contacts through which the individuals can obtain scarce goods (provision ties) (see Völker 
and Flap, 2001). In the institutional context described above, provision ties to individuals 
who have revenues in hard currency have a significant influence on individual wealth. 
However, this effect only holds for those actors who cannot rely on revenues in hard currency 
from direct exchanges with nonresidents. In addition, individual wealth is moderately 
affected by the heterogeneity of personal contacts with respect to their occupation.
This study innovates on the existing literature concerning the effects of marketization 
in planned economies in several ways. From a theoretical point of view, marketization 
substantially alters the existing structure of economic exchanges, allowing for new forms of 
exchange to emerge. Thus, we argue that in order to explain the effects on inequality it is 
necessary to focus on the emerging structures, the informal rules that regulate them, and the 
new opportunities for exchange with resourceful actors that are made possible by 
marketization, rather than on specific professional categories. For example, state employees 
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working in SOEs turn out to be almost as wealthy as entrepreneurs, because they enjoy the 
same exchange opportunities. 
From the empirical point of view, to our knowledge this is the first Cuban quantitative 
study based on individual survey data and not on aggregated data released by the national 
statistical office. Concerning the generalizability of our results, this study is based on a 
sample of Havana residents selected on the basis of their opportunity to access the circuit 
where transactions are held in hard currency, as a function of their occupation. On the one 
hand, the sample choice is the result of a formal constrain, i.e., the Cuban government does 
not release any micro data and does not authorize large-scale surveys. On the other hand, as 
we argued in the method section and in the appendix, the sample was specifically designed to 
test our main hypotheses, concerning wealth differences between hidden populations (defined 
by having gatekeeping opportunities) for which no sampling frame exists. Nevertheless, our 
sample reflects reasonably well the general population in terms of the main demographic 
variables. In terms of the geographical distribution of economic inequality, the phenomena 
described here are representative of the most urbanized and developed areas. As opportunities 
to access the circuit where transactions occur in hard currency are concentrated around urban 
and more developed areas, we expect that higher inequality would be found in a national 
sample including rural areas.  
Our results are superficially consistent with market transition theory (Nee, 1989) 
because new categories of market actors that did not exist prior to the reforms, namely 
entrepreneurs, are accumulating wealth, while neither having ties to redistributors nor being a 
party member is associated to higher wealth. However, our analyses cut across the distinction 
between market and state as opposite realms and postulate a different mechanism, 
gatekeeping. Consistent with this idea, the benefits related to the reforms are not confined to 
market actors. Furthermore, based on the data discussed here, the reforms did create some 
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room for upward mobility for new actors. However, the possibility to commodify political 
power cannot be excluded altogether. For example, it is quite plausible that powerful 
gatekeepers, such as executives and managers of SOEs operating in emergent sectors, are 
selected among the political elite (Corrales 2004), because these SOEs are strategically 
important to maintain the inflow of hard currency into the state coffers.
Studying the Chinese transition, Bian and Logan (1996) argued that the economic 
inequalities caused by market-oriented reforms generally do not subvert the inequalities 
based on political authority and both entrepreneurship and political power are rewarded. We 
hypothesize that something similar might be happening in Cuba as well, even though the 
Cuban transition is hardly comparable to the Chinese case. According to the typology of 
political economy in post-socialist countries, offered by King and Szeleny (2005), the Cuban 
reforms belong to the model of “capitalism from below”, because the Communist Party 
enacted them to cope with economic difficulties, often incorporating spontaneous processes, 
e.g., the dollarization. However, unlike in China, the Cuban government did not privatize and 
re-allocate property rights. Consequently, we find that in Cuba, the cleavage is not associated 
to ownership of the means of production, but to access to the circuit of commerce where the 
hard currency circulates.
The effects of the reforms were attenuated in the early 2000s (e.g. the incoming flow 
of hard currency was used to increase the investments in public education and health care), as 
soon as the Cuban government established favorable commercial relationships with new 
partners, especially Venezuela. Nonetheless, the adjustments of the early 2000s did not affect 
the commercial circuits. In 2011, as a result of changes in the international scenario 
negatively affecting the sustainability of Cuba's balance of trade, a second wave of market-
oriented reforms was implemented. In Cuba, the reforming impulse – mainly driven by 
adverse economic contingencies – seems to be accompanied by a constant concern for the 
Page 30 of 50
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ser































































consequences of liberalization in terms of social inequality, leading to a counter-reforming 
impulse. The correcting policy measures typically aim at limiting the rise of market actors 
and generating opportunities for those categories that suffered more from marketization (e.g., 
medical doctors, teachers, academics, army officers, etc.). Note that these categories, who 
represent about half of the reference group in our sample, appear in fact to be poorer. The 
Cuban ongoing fluctuation between reforms and adjustments possibly indicates that rewards 
accrue both to entrepreneurs as well as supportive people. As a matter of fact, what typically 
passes as market reforms could be seen as simple adjustments in the redistributive policies 
(cf. Bian and Logan, 1996).
As far as the present study is concerned, the mechanisms that we described will 
remain effective as long as the commercial circuits are in place. The distortions in the 
economy and the worsening conditions of some categories, e.g., professionals, have prompted 
the government to announce (repeatedly) that the monetary duality will soon be eliminated. 
However, removing the double currency per se will not suffice to neutralize the commercial 
circuits. Arbitrage is possible only when two currencies circulate simultaneously, but the 
opportunities for gatekeeping depend on the existence of formal and informal barriers 
preventing some categories of actors from exchanging freely. Given Cuba's structural 
economic dependency, it is rather probable that the government will maintain as much as 
possible its control over the inflow of hard currency. Therefore, actors with legitimate access 
to exchanges with foreigners are likely to maintain their privileges. Moreover, it cannot be 
excluded, that these privileged actors actively lobbied to defer the overruling of monetary 
duality and the further liberalizations approved by the last Party Congress in 2011 (cf. 
Hellman, 1998). To this end, they can use the argument that present structures are supposed 
to redistribute resources across different segments of the population and protect the most 
vulnerable categories of Cubans workers and citizen. However, even in the unlikely event 
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that in the near future all barriers between the circuits are eliminated, opportunities for 
gatekeeping will not disappear, but more likely become a function of personal relationships.
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1Here we provided an accurate description of the situation until 2013. Slight changes occurred since 2014, but 
the mechanisms that we describe remained generally true.
2Generally, a person who repeatedly hangs around with foreigners is called jinetero/a, literally jokey. This 
expression communicates a mixture of audacity, venality, and status seeking.
3Note that in the business literature intrapreneurs are conceived as a legitimate and desirable element of 
innovation while the activity of intrapreneurship described here, albeit often tolerated, is formally illegal and 
does not benefit the organization. We thank Victor Nee for suggesting the term intrapreneurs.
4The state employees who deal routinely with foreign customers actually receive a productivity incentive from 
the state. However, this incentive is very small and is typically returned to the state in the form of solidarity 
donation. This solidarity donation was instituted as a consequence of the increasing perception that tourism 
workers benefit disproportionally from their front office position vis-a-vis foreigners.
5 In 1960 the “Ley de Reforma Urbana” (Law of Urban Reform) confiscated the great majority of houses and 
forbade the sale, rental and private construction of houses. In addition, the law permitted former lessors to 
become owners after paying a monthly rent to the state for 20 years. Accordingly, about 85% of the Cuban 
population own their dwellings. 
6 The requirements of the Rasch Model are: 1) unidimensionality: the item responses depend on only one latent 
trait; 2) monotonicity: the probability to answer correctly or yes (as in the case that we are examining) is a 
monotone non decreasing function; 3) local independency: the variables reaction to the test are independent.
7Note that respondents mentioned relatives, friends, or acquaintances of long standing as provision ties. The 
duration of these relationships is generally high for all three groups, on average pre-dating the reforms (MN 
workers: mean = 18.45 years, sd =9.94; economic entrepreneurs: mean = 24.57 years, sd =13.83; social 
entrepreneurs: mean = 20.62, sd = 11.79). Therefore, reverse causality between wealth and provision 
networks is not plausible.
8 We also tried replicating our model using a broader definition of redistributors (i.e., including low-level 
officials and managers, e.g., jefe de departamento, supervisor, jefe de brigada etc.) and including a dummy 
variables to separate them from the rest of the MN workers. In this model redistributors increase from 10 to 
28 and individuals with at least one tie to a redistributor increase from 27 to 88. However, the results of the 
model remain the same. In addition, the 28 redistributors are not significantly richer than the rest of the MN 
workers and having a tie to a redistributor (defined broadly) has no significant effect on the expected count.
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Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
Dependent 
variable
Wealth 3,01 1,96 1,87 1,69 4,28 1,80 3,44 1,58
Independent 
variables
College 0,6 - 0,5 - 0,4 - 0,89 -
Age 43,79 13,89 40,42 13,62 53,59 13,67 40,10 10,14
Female 0,61 - 0,62 - 0,67 - 0,53 -
Remittances 0,2 - 0,15 - 0,26 - 0,21 -
White 0,65 - 0,62 - 0,66 - 0,67 -
Party affiliation 0,21 - 0,29 - 0,14 - 0,16 -
CUC ties 1,46 1,40 1,46 1,40 1,49 1,41 1,40 1,16
Redistributors ties 0,09 - 0,08 - 0,09 - 0,11 -
Heterogeneity 0,55 0,31 0,68 0,25 0,45 0,34 0,48 0,31
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TABLE 2. Poisson Models on Wealth
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
College (degree) 0.16* 0.13 0.14*
(0.066) (0.073) (0.074)
Quadratic Age -0.00* -0.00* -0.00**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.02** 0.02** 0.02**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Female -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
(0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
Remittances 0.34*** 0.20** 0.20**
(0.070) (0.073) (0.073)
White 0.13* 0.11 0.12
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066)






CUC ties 0.04 0.10**
(0.024) (0.038)
CUC ties* entre-/intra-preneurs -0.10*
(0.047)




Constant 0.52*** 0.01 -0.14
(0.132) (0.164) (0.180)
Observations 360 360 360
Ll -725.58 -670.13 -668.08
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Data collection took place in Havana between May 2010 and January 2011. As we were forced to 
collect data without a sampling frame, we selected the sample in order to ensure that the data 
included enough observations from individuals with different access to the commercial circuits 
(independent variable), in order to obtain the required statistical power to test hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
Accordingly, our sample consists of three groups:
1) entrepreneurs (n = 95, 26% of the whole sample);
2) intrapreneurs (n = 116, 32% of the whole sample);
3) MN workers (n = 149, 42% of the whole sample).  
As explained in the paper, the opportunities to exchange with CUC actors depend primarily 
on one’s job, but also on hidden individual characteristics. Accordingly, the sampling procedure 
differs for the three groups. As our grouping variable (legitimate access to the CUC circuit) depends 
on hidden characteristics, we selected respondents from segments of the population that have 
legitimate contacts with CUC actors with certainty. More explicitly, we selected the first two 
subsamples, entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs, among workers employed in the tourist sector. Note, 
however, that we selected front office workers special zed in services for nonresident tourists 
because they can interact with CUC actors without drawing unwanted attention, and not because of 
their economic sector of employment. Irrespective of their employment sector, Cuban workers who 
sell goods or services in MN have no gatekeeping opportunities because nonresidents are not allowed 
to purchase services intended for residents (i.e., belonging to the MN circuit). As we explained in the 
section where we describe the MN circuit, typically there are no legal barriers, but residents and 
nonresidents are segregated by a set of informal norms and sanctions. The normative component in 
Zelizer’s (2005) idea of commercial circuit clarifies the gatekeeping mechanism that we describe 
because the difference between having and not having gatekeeping opportunities does not only 
depend structural aspects, but also on those informal norms determining who can legitimately have 
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contacts with CUC actors and who cannot. Entrepreneurs are self-employed owners of bed and 
breakfast who are licensed to sell their services in CUCs. Intrapreneurs are tourist guides or 
entertainers working as employees in SOEs, who are routinely in contact with CUC actors. The third 
subsample, MN workers, constitute our reference category, consisting of ordinary workers who, due 
to their job, have no legitimate chance to come in contact with CUC actors. Hence, the latter is a 
subsample representing the general population of Havana’s workers employed in traditional 
segments of the economy. 
Data collection procedure
Interviewers were recruited among top sociology students and trained by the authors. The students 
conducted the interviews as part of a methodological laboratory. They received no financial 
compensation because the university regulation forbids paying students. Interviews were held face to 
face, research assistants contacted respondents in their homes, except the intrapreneurs who were 
interviewed on their workplace. Interviewees were assured about data confidentiality, independence 
from the government, and scientific scope of the research. We grouped the interviewers in teams of 
three to five students and gave every team the target to conduct 10-15 interviews, equally distributed 
with respect to the subsamples (entrepreneurs, and MN workers), and respecting quotas of the main 
demographic variables, i.e., an equal number of men and women, one third of non-white 
respondents, and equal number of interviewees per each of three age categories (18-34, 35-49, and 
over 50). Furthermore, we instructed interviewers not to contact relatives or people they knew 
personally and people living on remittances. Respondents were also asked their phone number so that 
the researchers could check that the interviews had taken place correctly. The data collection process 
was closely monitored during both the regular methodology lab meetings as well as ad-hoc meetings 
involving the students’ teams and the researchers. In particular, we took care that the interviewers 
took all necessary measures to maximize heterogeneity with respect to the individual characteristics.
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The data collection strategy was similar for entrepreneurs and MN workers: both subsamples 
were interviewed at home, in order to protect their privacy, and selected on a geographical base. 
Considering that Havana’s urban area is very large, public transportation is lacking and, as a rule, 
students could not be reimbursed, we assigned interviewers’ teams to quarters using a criterion of 
proximity with respect to the interviewers’ area of residence. We instructed students to select 
respondents randomly by choosing a residential street and then contacting every other household. If 
more household lived in one house, students were instructed to pick only one household. At the time 
of data collection no statistical information on the population composition of each quarter 
(municipios) was available (the Cuban National Statistics Bureau, ONEI, began to release some 
aggregated statistics only in 2013). As it is not uncommon in former socialist countries (e.g., see Flap 
and Volker 1997), all Havana’s municipios are rather heterogeneous in terms of social class, because 
since the early years of the revolution, housing policies aimed at minimizing inequality and 
residential segregation (Íñiguez 2014). Accordingly, a mix of nationalizations, centralized allocation 
of houses, and the absence of a housing market ensured that 85% Cubans own their house. In our 
sample, only 10% of the respondents cannot advance any claim on the house where they live, the rest 
either own their houses, or can legally claim the right to occupy the house where they live 
indefinitely, in accordance with the Cuban law. In addition, as houses could not be sold or purchased, 
but only swapped, geographical mobility remained very low (see Mesa Lago 2017 on Cuban housing 
policies and regulations). Some housing mobility appeared only after data collection when a law 
formally re-introduced the housing market (Decreto Ley No. 288, 22 noviembre 2011). 
As the entrepreneurs in our sample are mainly owners of bed and breakfast, they are not 
equally distributed in all of Havana’s municipios. Most of them are located in the central areas of the 
city: Centro Habana, La Habana Vieja, Playa, Plaza de la Revolucion, and near the beaches that are 
most popular with foreign tourists (e.g., Habana del Este). For this reason, there is a concentration of 
entrepreneurs operating in those areas in our sample (see table 1.1). These entrepreneurs are called 
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arrendadores (literally lessors). Arrendadores operating in CUC are the majority among workers 
licensed to operate in CUC, the others are artists and restaurant owners (Pèrez, Calderòn, and 
Gonzalez, 2008). Artists are few and they are difficult to identify and, at the time of data collection, 
interviewing restaurant owners was extremely difficult because, due to scandals involving tax 
evasion and other irregularities committed by restaurant owners, Cuban authorities were monitoring 
restaurants closely and the owners were very reluctant to be interviewed. Therefore, we chose to 
concentrate on bed and breakfast owners. The province of Havana has the highest number of bed and 
breakfast licensed to operate in CUC (ibidem: 122). Bed and Breakfast operating in CUC can be 
easily identified because they display a specific blue sign.
The last subsample consists of intrapreneurs, i.e., workers employed in SOEs operating in the 
tourist sector, who due to their job have a privileged and legitimate access to customers carrying 
CUC. For this type of actors, we had no other choice than to select them from their workplace. To 
this end, we contacted two of the main state agencies providing services to tourists in Havana 
(Cubatur, Habaguanex see table 1.2). We also interviewed some workers from other agencies that we 
contacted through the state training agency that provides ordinary training courses to state workers 
who are employed in the tourist sector. Unlike the other two samples, intrapreneurs were interviewed 
directly by the researchers (the first author and some collaborators from the University of Havana), 
often with the help of the students. We varied the day of the week and the time of the day of the 
interviews in order to cover all possible work shifts. We do not know the area of residence of these 
workers. However, we have no reason to suppose that they live near the agency because, given the 
lack of public transportation, these agencies offer an ad hoc commuting service to their workers. 
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Habana vieja 90.682 52% 4,37 20.751,03 8 3 11
Diez Octubre 212.171 53% 12,28 17.277,77 20 7 27
Cerro  129.196 53% 10,19 12.678,7 13 . 13
Plaza de la 
Revolucion  152.318 54% 12,3 12.383,58 19 25 44
Centro Habana 151.174 53% 12,3 12.290,57 14 39 53
San Miguel del 
Padron 158.268 51% 25,5 6.206,588 3 . 3
Marianao   132.976 52% 23,17 5.739,145 5 . 5
Playa 176.614 53% 35,81 4.931,974 11 8 19
Regla  42.707 51% 10,22 4.178,767 . . 0
La Lisa 133.350 51% 37,14 3.590,468 9 3 12
Arroyo Naranjo 210.214 51% 82,18 2.557,97 2 . 2
Boyeros 184.647 51% 134,8 1.369,785 5 2 7
Habana del Este 172.783 51% 141,49 1.221,168 33 8 41
Cotorro 74.670 51% 65,9 1.133,08 2 1 3
Guanabacoa   113.728 51% 129,48 878,3441 4 . 4
Total 2.135.498 52% 737,13 2897,044 148** 96 244
*Elaboration of the authors, source ONEI 2010
** 1 missing case on the information municipios
Table 1.2. Frequencies of intrapreneurs by company 
Company Freq. Percent







Post- hoc evaluation of the sample representativity
Because we could not select respondents from a sampling frame, we evaluate our sample ex post, 
comparing descriptive statistics of personal characteristics with available population statistics, and 
search for possible sources of bias. As stated in the paper, the sample reflects the characteristics of 
the population with respect to race (cfr Censo de Población y Viviendas 2012). For our control 
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sample (MN workers), we managed to cover all municipios (see table 1.1) and obtain a sample with 
the required distribution of personal characteristics. The only municipio for which we have no 
respondents is Regla, which is a large industrial area. At the time of data collection, official statistics 
on the population age distribution among state workers were not available (cfr. ONEI 2011). 
Therefore, we sampled the MN workers aiming to maximize age heterogeneity. The subsample of 
MN workers includes 36,2% of respondents aged between 18-34; 40,9% aged between 34-49; and 
22,8% aged over 50.  In order to do a post-hoc evaluation of the representativity of the subsample of 
MN workers, we use statistics on the Cuban workers population (ONEI 2010) for comparison, 
because statistics on the Havana working population are not available. Statistics on the age 
distribution among Cuban workers do not distinguish among types of workers, i.e. state workers or 
entrepreneurs.  However, as the bulk of Cuban workers are state-employees, we compare the age 
distribution of MN workers and intrapreneurs (both state-workers) with the population statistics of 
the Cuban workers.  Table 1.3 shows that our sample reflects quite well the population age 
distribution among state workers in Cuba. However, the Cuban official statistics classify Cuban 
workers according to age-classes (i.e. 17-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-60, 60+ years) that differ from those 
that we chose in the sampling design (i.e. 18-34, 35-49, 50+years). The comparison between our 
sample and official statistics shows that the age-class 20-29 is overrepresented among MN workers. 
However, this overrepresentation is largely a consequence of the age categorization that we used, for 
example one quarter of MN workers that in our subsample are included in the age class 17-29 was 
actually 28 or 29 years old (8,7% of the total MN workers that we sampled). On the contrary, the 
post-hoc evaluation of the subsample of intrapreneurs indicates that in this group the age distribution 
is consistent with the population age distribution among state workers (see. table 1.3.). In the 
subsamples of intrapreneurs and MN workers, older workers (60+) are slightly underrepresented. 
However, for intrapreneurs this is probably due to the type of job, which generally requires workers 
to be relatively fit.
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By contrast, among the entrepreneurs it was impossible to keep an equal distribution with 
respect to gender and age. In particular, among the entrepreneurs interviewers had difficulties finding 
enough male respondents and enough respondents in the lowest age category. The subsample of 
entrepreneurs includes: 8,4% of respondents aged between 18-34; 37,9% aged 35-49 and 53,7% aged 
over 50. However, older people are indeed generally prevalent in the population of entrepreneurs due 
to the licensing policies concerning private enterprises adopted until 2011 (Romanò and Echevarria 
2015). According to a study focusing on the entrepreneurs population, most entrepreneurs are 60 
years old or older (32% of the men and 48% of the women) and the younger age categories have 
lower frequencies (Pèrez, Calderòn, Gonzalez, 2008, p.116). Therefore, the age composition of the 
entrepreneurs in our subsample substantively reflects the general population of entrepreneurs. The 
gender bias can be explained by the type of activity. Bed and breakfasts are most often managed by 
women. However, the overrepresentation of women constitutes a conservative bias, as ceteris 
paribus, women are generally poorer than men and they are overrepresented in the group that we 
predict to be the richest. 
Finally, according to ONEI (2013) – these are the earliest data available for Havana –, 
workers holding managerial or apical positions as well as low-level officials and managers 
(directivos y quadros) in state institutions or enterprises are about 5.5% of the population in Havana. 
Although there was no way to sample redistributors, using a more restrictive definition of 
redistributors than the one found in ONEI, we identified 10 redistributors in our control sample, i.e., 
about 6.7% of the MN workers. By contrast, if we used ONEI’s broader definition, we would have 
an overrepresentation of redistributors among MN workers, as they account for 18,8% of the 
subsample. As, by definition, redistributors occupy apical positions, this overrepresentation 
determines a conservative bias with respect to our main hypotheses. 
To conclude, in general the deviations of our sample from the population statistics tend to be 
conservative with respect of the paper’s hypotheses.
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Table 1.3. Age distribution among MN workers and entrepreneurs and post-hoc evalutation.
Post-hoc evaluation: Age distribution among state workers in Cuba (ONEI 2010)  
Age-classes Cuban workers* Intrapreneurs MN workers
17-29 22,10% 21,60% 31,5%
30-39 24,90% 25,90% 14,10%
40-59 46,60% 50,90% 46,30%
60 + 6,30% 1,70% 8,10%
Total 100% 100% 100%
*Elaboration of the authors, source ONEI 2010
Robustness check: an OLS model using the wealth index computed with polychoric PCA
In the paper, we present the results of three nested Poisson regression models on individual wealth, 
using a wealth index constructed with the Rasch measurement model. This index is a count variable 
following a Poisson distribution, not overdispersed and not zero inflated. Negative binomial 
regression models are often used with Poisson distributions, but when the estimated dispersion 
parameter α is equal to zero, as in our case, the binomial negative model reduces to a Poisson model 
(Long 1997). 
We also constructed an alternative index using polycholric principal component analysis on the 
wealth items concerning ownership of durable goods. The polychoric PCA wealth index is a 
continuous variable with a right-skewed distribution. Thus, we are able to check the robustness of 
our results using an OLS regression model on this alternative measurement of wealth. Below, we 
present the results of the full OLS model, next to the full Poisson model (model 3 in the paper). The 
coefficients of the OLS model cannot be interpreted because the dependent variable is a standardized 
factor score, while the Poisson log link function can be used to compute predicted changes on the 
expected count of the wealth index (in the paper we reported the predicted changes for the effects 
related to the hypotheses supported by the model). Although the coefficients magnitude cannot be 
compared, the results of the two models are substantially equivalent. The only noticeable difference 
is that the significance level of three variables is slightly reduced in the OLS model. The p value of 
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the interaction effect between circuital position and the number of ties to CUC actors goes from 
0.042 to 0.063. Thus, the effect remains significant at p < 0.05 only with a one-tailed test. Similar 
variations affect two control variables: education and the main effect of age, although the latter 
remains significant at p < 0.05 with a two tailed test. Besides allowing the use of predicted changes 
to interpret the results, we chose to put the Poisson model in the paper because the polychoric index 
rests on the assumption that each binary item is determined by a latent continuous normally-
distributed variable, in this case the ability to acquire the good. However, it is more reasonable to 
assume that for many of our items the distribution of the ability to acquire the good is skewed, rather 
than normal, as generally typical of wealth measurements. In the paper, we provide arguments 
supporting the claim that the Rasch model is superior to the polychoric PCA index. The model 
comparison provided here shows that our results hold even if we use a less precise measurement 
model for our dependent variable.    
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Table 1.4. Poisson and OLS full Regression models on wealth 
Poisson model OLS Model
Dependent variable: wealth Rasch index Polychoric PCA index
College (degree)  0.14* 0.29
 (0.074)   (0.154)
Quadratic Age  -0.00**    -0.00**
 (0.000)    (0.000)
Age    0.24**   0.04*
  (0.009)    (0.017)
Female -0.05 -0.15
   (0.064)    (0.138)
Remittances     0.20**      0.59**
  (0.073)    (0.170)
White 0.12  0.08
 (0.066)    (0.140)
Party affiliation         -0.04 -0.09
  (0.082)     (0.170)
Entrepreneur       0.88***       1.99***
  (0.090)    (0.191)
Intrapreneur      0.58***       1.06***
   (0.087)    (0.174)
CUC ties     0.10**      0.23**
  (0.038)    (0.068)
CUC ties* entre-/intra-preneurs  -0.10*  -0.18+
  (0.047)    (0.097)
Redistributors ties -0.00 -0.09
   (0.011)     (0.237)
Heterogeneity   0.27*    0.52*
  (0.112)    (0.243)
Constant      -0.14***       -2.22***
  (0.180)     (0.333)
Observations 360 360
Adj. R-squared Nap 0.33
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1 (two tailed tests)
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